Evaluation and the Social Construction of Impacts

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The central questions of this article are when, how and what do governmental agencies learn from evaluations. A structural constructivist theoretical framework is developed and applied to two case studies, both of which take a report by the Dutch Court of Audit (CoA) as a starting point. A reconstruction is made of the intra- and interorganizational processes through which the impacts of these evaluations were socially constructed. It appears that an evaluation has hardly any direct effect that can be unequivocally ascribed to it. Rather, evaluations seem to support or counteract debates, tendencies and options already present (or ‘under construction’) in the interaction among the actors involved. Using a structural constructivist theoretical framework we identify mechanisms and conditions that enhance forms of learning processes. This article concludes with some hypotheses about the genesis of evaluation impact.

Introduction

Evaluation studies in the public domain may have different functions. One of them certainly is the improvement of the object evaluated, which may be a policy or a (semi-) governmental organizational unit. Evaluations may trigger changes in policy making, management, procedures or implementation strategies, but when and how do they do so? Even if goals are fixed and results can be assessed unequivocally, it is not at all self-evident how evaluation results will be utilized. When are they recognized as relevant? When do they trigger defensive or proactive responses? How are they translated into behaviours directed at ‘improvement’? Very often in the sphere of public administration, both conditions (fixed goals and unequivocal results) are not even met.

Research into the utilization of evaluation has identified a number of conditions that appear to stimulate utilization in one way or another. Examples are: the timing of reports in relation to the actual stage of a policy process (Mulder et al., 1991; Rist, 1994: 194–9); the source of evaluation data (internal or external); the credibility of the source; the method of communicating results (Rist, 1994:
200–3); the quality of the presentation (Pröpper and De Vries, 1995); and whether or not there is an institutionalized evaluation practice (Leeuw and Rozendal, 1994). Oh (1996) develops a model in which the search for and utilization of knowledge in governmental bureaucracies are explained in terms of the characteristics of political issues, the organization, the individual and the information concerned. Patton (1997) points at the importance of user involvement in the formulation of central evaluation questions, choosing methods etc.

However, such an inventory of conditions does not in itself explain why evaluation results are used in specific instances and not in others. On the one hand, not all conditions mentioned need to be met for utilization to occur. On the other hand, even when a number of favourable conditions are in force, utilization is not guaranteed. Moreover: what is ‘utilization’? How are evaluation results made use of? Policy makers, whose policy is being evaluated, may react in a defensive way and try to avoid the scrutiny of the evaluator. But they may also take evaluation studies seriously and act accordingly, e.g. in conformity with suggestions the evaluator has made. They may take the evaluation seriously, but draw quite different conclusions and consequences from it than the evaluator did. Evaluations may be used to legitimate and ‘sell’ policies or they may be used to change policies in a superficial or fundamental way. What determines the actual reaction to and application of evaluation results? I will try to contribute to an answer by conceiving of the influence of evaluation in terms of learning processes. More specifically, I will focus on the analysis and explanation of learning processes in governmental units induced or enhanced by Court of Audit (CoA) evaluations.

The next section elaborates the concept of organizational learning and why I think it fruitful in connection with the present research questions. I will then introduce a ‘structural-constructivist’ theoretical framework, which will be used to describe and analyse learning processes in two case studies, which are summarized in the sections to follow. Both cases take an evaluation study by the Dutch Court of Audit as their starting point and try to reconstruct related learning processes in the governmental units most involved. Finally I draw conclusions as to the relation between evaluation and change at the organizational level.

Organizational Learning

Evaluations may trigger learning at the individual level. However, in discussing the impact of evaluation in and on public administration, we should focus on transformation in the organization or behaviour of governmental units and hence on organizational learning.

Organizational learning (cf. Argyris, 1992) may be defined as any process of change in organizational structures, codes or practices that is triggered or reinforced by new experiences, new interactions or new information. Note that this definition does not say anything about the process itself, but only, in part, about its inputs and results. In later sections we will turn to the question of how these types of inputs are used to produce such results.

Thinking about the impact of evaluation on governmental behaviour in terms of learning processes has a number of advantages:
evaluation generates information and perhaps new interactions or experiences for the unit evaluated. These ‘inputs’ are implied in the concept of organizational learning;

• the notion of learning processes draws our attention to the processing of inputs. Learning processes imply sensemaking and the development of new practices, often piecemeal and by trial and error;

• it directs our attention to changes at the organizational level. Individual learning may reinforce organizational learning, but will not necessarily do so. It is therefore relevant to gain insight into when and how.

There is also a disadvantage. It concerns the danger of thinking too easily about organizational change in anthropomorphic terms. Some (Senge, 1992) hold that organizational learning requires learning by individuals within the organization. But individual learning is certainly not a sufficient condition for organizational learning and perhaps not even a necessary one. Hence, I do not consider individual learning to be a valid metaphor for organizational transformation, but will try to understand how collective processes of sensemaking in the construction of new behaviours take place.3

A Structural-Constructivist Approach

When and how do governmental units learn from evaluations related to their organization or performance? It seems useful to break this question down into a number of smaller ones:

• When and how are evaluations identified?
• When and how are they read or listened to?
• How are they interpreted?
• How do they become related to organizational characteristics or organizational behaviour?
• How do they eventually lead to changes in organizational structure or behaviour?

Implied in all these ‘steps’ are two important ideas. The first is the notion of interpretation, or perhaps better, the construction of meaning and behaviour. Giving meaning, if only implicitly, is essential because it determines whether an evaluation is recognized as relevant, how ideas of the ways in which it may be used are generated and how these are translated into actual practice.

In research on the impact of evaluation, the role of giving meaning (or sense-making [Weick, 1995]) and the social construction of behaviour is often neglected. This is the case in research in which one tries to explain the impact of evaluation in terms of the characteristics of the evaluation itself (its ‘quality’, its presentation) or in terms of structural conditions (timing, embedding in institutionalized procedures) (cf. Leeuw and Rozendal, 1994; Rist, 1994). In such research, giving meaning is (implicitly) considered irrelevant, or, more likely, unproblematic. In the latter case it is presupposed that evaluation results are unequivocal and have the same meaning for all actors involved. This is not only at variance...
with much recent social scientific insight, but in the case of the impact of Court of Audit reports also demonstrably incorrect (see cases below).

The second basic idea underlying the steps above is that there is a connection between sensemaking and organizational patterns. These patterns condition and direct sensemaking processes (but do not determine them fully), whilst at the same time sensemaking generally will be reflected in some measure of change in organizational culture, procedures, technology or structure.

The thesis presented here is that, in order to explain the impact of evaluation, we need a better and more detailed understanding of the processes of the construction of meaning and behaviour within (and between) organizations. We also need to understand the way in which these processes are influenced by and influence organizational patterns. Structural constructivism\(^4\) offers a fruitful framework to pursue this mission.

Structural constructivism starts from the notion that actors (individuals, groups, organizations or even networks) can, at any moment, be characterized by a *repertoire*. Repertoires are defined as stabilized ways of thinking and acting (on the individual level) or stabilized codes, operations and technology\(^5\) (on other levels). The concept of repertoire is akin to ‘frame’ (Giddens, 1984: 87), ‘scheme’ and ‘definition of the situation’ (e.g. Hewitt, 1984: 75–85, 139–51). Nevertheless I prefer ‘repertoire’ since it has stronger connotations of behavioural patterns than the other concepts. When dealing with patterns of (inter-)organizational learning, these behavioural components, as encapsulated in procedures and technology, seem to be even more important than their cognitive reflections (cf. March and Simon, 1958: 177, who also use the term repertoire more or less in this sense; Allison, 1971: 72).

The theoretical ideas about the genesis, interrelations, functioning and change of repertoires can be summarized as follows:

- **Repertoires are the residuals of preceding interaction processes** in which meanings and behaviours are constructed and have acquired a measure of self-evidence. The Court of Audit is characterized by certain procedures, normative frameworks etc. that reflect a developmental process over time. Governmental agencies also have their acquired ideas on aims, policy instruments, limits of steering, the role of other actors etc., which will colour their perception of and reaction to evaluations.
- **Different actors have different repertoires** because they have different histories, different experiences, different positions and different relations. Thus, the Court of Audit and a governmental agency may apply different criteria to judge the effectiveness or legitimacy of a policy.
- **Repertoires are used in the process of sensemaking and construction of behaviour**. Individuals and groups apply their existing ways of thinking and acting in order to give meaning to new inputs and to react upon them. This implies that impacts of evaluations are not determined by the logic of the evaluator, but by the repertoire-based interpretations and (re)actions of the agent involved.
- Since different actors have different repertoires, they continuously produce
behaviours that are not self-evident for (some) other actors. To a certain extent these other actors are confronted with equivocality (ambiguity). A governmental unit receiving an unexpected evaluation is puzzled: what does it mean? The unit will be inclined to reduce this equivocality (ambiguity) in order to give meaning to the evaluation and to react to it. By definition the existing repertoire is insufficient in this connection. The repertoire will change somewhat in consequence. This process of change can be called ‘learning’.

- **Repertoires are connected.** Individuals are generally involved in multiple, partly related social contexts. A minister functions in political circles in which party ideologies, parliamentary majorities and accountability are probably central in the dominant repertoire. On the other hand, the minister is also an administrator and perhaps to a certain extent even a manager focused on economy and effectiveness. And s/he is also a partner in consultations with societal groups and organizations, which may involve repertoires in which cooperation, harmony and support may be central themes. In reacting to evaluations, all these repertoires will play their part. On the one hand, this implies that different repertoires become linked to each other. On the other hand, it follows that at the group, organizational or network level, the dominant repertoire is never fully shared by the constituent individuals, subgroups, departments or representatives of organizations. We say that different individuals or subgroups are included in different repertoires to a larger or smaller extent. This implies that in processes of sensemaking at the group and organizational level – and perhaps even at the individual level – equivocality (ambiguity) comes not only from other actors, but also from within: the process of sensemaking (reducing equivocality) also produces equivocality.

- **Repertoire elements are anchored** in different ways. Often repertoire elements will not only be anchored in one isolated repertoire, but also in other repertoires and hence in relations with other actors. On the one hand this is a consequence of the interconnection between repertoires discussed above. The results of an evaluation study are not only interpreted in terms of the dominant repertoire of the governmental unit, but also in terms of individual repertoires (perhaps in relation to personal career aspirations) or from the perspective of consulting bodies in which the unit is represented. On the other hand, the anchoring of repertoire elements in other repertoires is a consequence of the fact that third actors always play a role. Sensemaking and construction of reactions within the unit never take place in isolation. At the very least they will anticipate the reactions of other actors in the policy area. And when the evaluation study is public (as is generally the case at some point in time with Court of Audit investigations), actual reactions of other actors are available during the sensemaking and construction process, which will consequently be influenced.

- **Learning requires the loosening of anchors and/or the development of new links.** New links, in the sense of new connections between repertoire elements, or in the sense of including new elements in the repertoire, seem to
be more likely if there is a certain overlap between repertoires. In our case, this concerns the repertoire of the Court of Audit and that of the governmental unit, e.g. the framework for the judgement of performance. But again, constructing the impact of evaluation is not a bilateral process. It involves other actors as well. One can imagine that a governmental unit considers the results of an evaluation irrelevant (because it comes from ‘another world’), but that at the same time the evaluation receives positive attention in the press or in Parliament. Changes in the repertoire of the focal unit may not then be a consequence of the content of the evaluation as such, but of the meaningful reactions of third parties.

The implication of this argument is that we need to have an image of the major repertoires (by definition plural) in the policy area if we are to understand when and how evaluation has which effects. But although this may help to interpret results in retrospect, our aims should be somewhat higher. For example, how is it determined which elements of evaluation get attention, what meanings are ascribed to them, and when and how does the translation to organizational behaviour take place? It is to these mechanisms and conditions that our research project is directed. Two of the cases we studied are described below. They will be explored in terms of the theoretical framework outlined above, in order to generate a number of more specific hypotheses on the impact of evaluation on governmental learning.

The Court of Audit

The Court of Audit (CoA) is an independent institution with constitutional auditing tasks and authority. Originally its main task was to ascertain whether government expenditures were in accordance with the law. Gradually new elements were introduced, such as assessments of efficiency, effectiveness and the effects of specific policies and audits on organization and management. These new types of activities have been anchored in successive adaptations of the Government Accounts Act, in part as a canonization of existing practices (Dolmans, 1989; Leeuw, 1992). The Court of Audit proper consists of three members. The supporting organization (almost 350 people) is divided into a number of sections, each heading a number of departmental units. These units, which perform most of the basic research and maintain most of the contacts with the departments of government, are in most cases physically located inside those departments.

The usual procedure in efficiency/effectiveness/effect studies starts with a proposal for (further) study by the departmental unit. Such a proposal is partly based on their contacts with the department, on observations of what is going on or on the monitoring of what has happened with previous CoA studies. The strategic plan for a five-year period and the year plan of the CoA are the framework within which the proposals are made. If the Court endorses the proposal, the research takes place using written materials from the department, other internal or external evaluations and audits, interviews with actors within and outside the
The resulting report of the findings is checked with colleagues within the department. This often leads to revisions to the report. After the Court has given its consent, the minister involved is asked to react. The results are summarized in periodical reports (such as the annual report) or sometimes in a separate, more extensive publication. In both cases the CoA includes a short account of the reaction of the minister and its own comments on this reaction in the final report, which is sent to Parliament and may get substantial press coverage.

The Lynx

In 1974 the Dutch Minister of Defence planned the procurement of 36 ‘standard’ helicopters for the Royal Dutch Navy. In the same year the Westland WG–13 (Lynx) was chosen. Between 1975 and 1983, 24 Lynx helicopters were actually bought, in three types (A, B and C). The last 12 were postponed and later cancelled because a new project to replace the Lynx by a new helicopter (NH–90) was already underway.

On 10 March 1987, the Court of Audit (CoA) published its report on the procurement and availability of the Lynx. The findings of the CoA can be summarized as follows:

- there was no clear set of criteria and no clear plan in the procurement process;
- there was no real (price) competition between producers, because too hasty a choice was made for the Westland Lynx;
- standardization was a failure, because three different versions were procured and no international coordination of procurement took place;
- information to Parliament was fragmentary and incomplete. Initially NLG 192 million was budgeted for 24 helicopters, while eventually NLG 361 million was paid. These facts were only partially reported to Parliament. It was unclear whether these amounts included sensors, weapons, spare parts, documentation, training etc. There was never a total overview;
- bad arrangements were made concerning price adaptations;
- an alarming lack of readiness of the helicopters (less than 40%) and low availability of spare parts was apparent.

Did the investigations of the CoA and their results lead to learning processes within the Ministry of Defence, and if so, which and with what observable results? At first sight this looks like an almost unanswerable question. If a change takes place after the publication of a report, it is not at all certain that it is a consequence of that report. The day after the report appeared, the Ministry issued a situation report on the Lynx. But why did it do so? There may be reasons other than the CoA report. Even if there is a change that seems congruent with the findings of the report, a causal connection is not self-evident. On the other hand, if a change precedes the report, that change might be a consequence of the anticipation of it. Even if changes prior to or after the report are not congruent with its contents, they still may be triggered by the report. Moreover, policy changes, or changes in organizational practices, hardly ever have only a single cause, while
a single input (the CoA report) may have differential – and even contradictory – effects on different actors or subgroups.

The theoretical framework presented above does not suggest searching primarily for a direct correspondence between the contents of an evaluation report and changes in policy or management, but draws our attention towards the social construction processes of these changes. What follows is a partial report of our reconstruction of the Lynx case. We proceeded as follows:

• From the CoA report, defence budgets, Parliamentary and other public documents, we built up a picture of the major developments, debates and measures with respect to the procurement and readiness of the Lynx, to provide a starting point and a ‘context’ for further research.

• Then we studied the CoA archive with respect to the report. From this we gained an understanding of the actions and interactions undertaken preceding the report, including the exchange of information and views with the Ministry and with the Navy.

• On the bases of the preceding two points we made a tentative list of relevant actors and a list of issues we would like to have their view on, because these might mirror the relevant parts of their repertoires.

• Next we conducted interviews with different actors in order to complement our perceptions of the relevant developments, the relevant repertoires of the actors involved, their perceptions of and reactions to the CoA report and to the reactions of others. In doing so we also complemented our understandings of changes in repertoires and how they came about.

• Finally, based on the preceding steps and utilizing the structural constructivist theoretical framework, we put forward a tentative explanation of the governmental learning processes related to the inputs generated by the CoA.

This reconstruction is summarized below in two steps. First, I give a short description of the repertoires of a number of key actors, viz. the CoA (and more specifically the Defence Bureau of the CoA), the Navy and the political leadership of the Ministry of Defence. Second, I describe and explain the reactions of the latter two actors and their consequences, referring to the three repertoires. Of course there are more actors and more repertoires. Reference to these will be made when necessary. The same holds for sub-units within the actors just mentioned. But a reconstruction of the level of interaction between (and within) these three actors will suffice to demonstrate the approach and to generate a number of fruitful conclusions and hypotheses to be formulated by the end of this article.

Table 1 summarizes some characteristics of the dominant repertoires that appeared to be relevant in our case study. We derived them from utterances of members of the units involved, and also – as far as the CoA is concerned – from written reflections (Bemelmans-Videc, 1998).

General Reactions to the CoA Lynx Report

According to our Navy informants, the CoA report was a traumatic experience for the Navy. There was a kind of double reaction. On the one hand, horror: ‘Is
Table 1

Court of Audit (Defence Bureau)

**General:**
- The CoA is independent and bases its assessment on factual data.
- The CoA chooses subjects, timing and forms of presentation that will enhance actual use of the reports in policy processes.
- The main aim of ‘value for money’ investigations of the CoA is to assess the extent to which initial policy goals are realized, the economy of spending, and the efficiency of implementation.
- Clear information and control are essential to realize value for money.
- CoA investigations have a preventive and sometimes a correcting effect.

**Defence Bureau:**
- Good relations with the units evaluated (in this case the Ministry of Defence and the Navy) are necessary as a precondition both for obtaining relevant information and for a constructive reception of findings. Relations are, in fact, considered good.
- The Navy is inclined to give top priority to technological sophistication. This is understandable, but the CoA remains critical in this regard.

**Navy:**
- Navy operations are core business. Of course, in a democracy, giving information to Parliament and financial accountability etc. are necessary. But these should not preempt effective and efficient operations management.
- Quality and efficiency mean buying the best technology that can be afforded with available budgets.
- The tactical and strategic concepts of the Navy are not mere ideas, but have been anchored in military hardware procured in the past.
- Procuring advanced military systems is not buying off the shelf. You hook on to a development process that is underway. It is a seller’s market. Deviation from contractual specifications is often necessary, but unavoidably leads to much higher costs.
- CoA evaluations generally are useful, though they often lack expertise.

**Political Leadership:**
- It is always necessary to weigh different interests (which may be military-strategic in nature, or related to foreign or industrial policy).
- Parliamentary support is paramount.
- (From the beginning of the 1980s) reduction of budgets, control of spending.
- Gradual introduction of new internal control mechanisms for defence procurement.
- Fear of negative publicity.
- The Navy is very capable and has high expertise. But it is rather ‘closed’ and hard to control.
- CoA investigations are primarily useful for the Civil Service and perhaps for the Navy, but not so much for the political leadership.
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It so bad?'; and on the other hand, resentment: ‘We are judged far too negatively’. There was also concern about the public image of the Navy. These general feelings contributed, according to these respondents, to increased attention to the presentation and accountability of procurement projects. There were also pressures from the political level in more or less the same direction – budget control and businesslike procedures. However, these activities were continually seen as an extra burden that tended to interfere with the core operations.

These reactions from the Navy are understandable in view of the professional self-image anchored in its dominant repertoire. Although the Navy does not share the normative framework applied by the CoA (see also below), a number of CoA comments clearly hook on to key notions of good and reliable management and of the professional image the Navy is proud of. The consequent behavioural change may well, therefore, be interpreted in terms of organizational learning in which part of the repertoire (concerning accountability, transparency, contacts with politicians and public relations) changes to maintain and strengthen other parts of the repertoire (professional control, advanced technology, quality and efficiency).

With the political leadership, the report also induced a double reaction. On the one hand, the Minister explicitly recognized imperfections in the procurement process and level of readiness. On the other hand, with a view to international and technological circumstances, the political leadership took the view that an alternative course of events would not have been possible. So the CoA report seems to have confirmed the idea that the Navy was hard to control and that improvements in the procurement process (introduced mainly because of the need for tighter financial control) were justified. At the same time the repertoire of the political leadership implied much confidence in the Navy and a high sensitivity towards the difficulties of decision making and planning in a dynamic environment. From this it is quite understandable that much of the CoA critique was considered too exaggerated or even irrelevant.

These general attitudes with respect to the CoA report seem to play an important role in the verbal and substantial (re)actions to specific points which we found in documents and heard in interviews.

**Planning**

The CoA critique, that there were no clear goals and as a consequence no clear planning at the start of the Lynx procurement project, is understandable from the CoA repertoire. Since there is no clear goal, its attainment can hardly be assessed. From the point of view of the CoA the procurement process is whimsical – hard to assess and evaluate. This is even more problematic since there is no comprehensive financial overview.

To the Navy, on the contrary, a relatively open goal formulation at the outset is an advantage, because it allows for flexible adaptation to new developments and circumstances. This is in conformity with the drive to procure the most advanced systems, which is why the Navy tries to keep this openness.

The Minister and his Deputy essentially agreed with the substance of the CoA critique at this point. They claimed however that improvements were underway.
New procurement procedures for large projects were implemented (Dutch acronym: DMP). These improvements, according to the Minister, were initiated independently of the CoA investigations, but the feeling that the Navy is hard to control continued in the political leadership. The CoA reinforced a repertoire change that was already underway, be it partly for other reasons.

**Competition**
The CoA report argued that economy in the spending of public money implies organizing maximal competition between suppliers, and that, by consequence, an early choice to go with one vendor is ill advised. This position is consistent with the focus on economy, which is central to the CoA repertoire.

The Navy considered this point nonsense: ‘You don’t buy a (military) helicopter in the supermarket, you invest in a development trajectory’. At the time there was, according to the Navy (and the then Minister), simply no alternative to the Lynx development trajectory. We could not trace any substantial action or change in or by the Navy related to this point. There seems to be no new connection between repertoire elements in this respect, which can be understood from the very large differences between the repertoires concerned.

Although the political leadership was subtler in their reaction (they claimed that studies performed before the Lynx was chosen could be considered as applying competition to a certain extent), they too kept insisting that there was no alternative.

**Standardization**
With respect to standardization, there was a more or less clear goal at the start: both internal and international standardization should be striven for. From the CoA repertoire it is natural that the CoA made a point of the fact that neither form of standardization was realized.

The Navy considers standardization as a value in its own right, but it is not given the highest priority. Adaptation to military-strategic and technological developments is considered at least as important. The Navy feels that sensible spending of public money is buying the best you can get. This way of thinking is so strongly anchored in the repertoire that it often appears in mere technical terms: ‘The Lynx-A appeared too light to carry the sensors and weapons required’ (my emphasis). Therefore, even in retrospect, within the Navy one cannot see how the procurement process (three versions) could have been otherwise.

The political leadership had two somewhat contradictory reactions at this point. On the one hand, it felt that the CoA was unfair in not giving due attention to technological and political developments during the procurement process. To their mind, the Navy should not be forced to work with systems that are technologically and conceptually outdated. On the other hand, standardization is considered desirable from the point of view of efficiency, reliability, readiness and cost control. This combination of reactions, both of which are clearly related to their repertoire, led the policy makers to make an effort to standardize ex post. In 1986 the Lynx Maintenance Project Bureau was charged with this task, which was also intended to extend the operational period of the Lynx. The CoA did not
suggest this solution. Nevertheless the CoA investigations may well have played a role. It is also probable that Parliament played a role in this connection. Parliament made many remarks on the financial aspects of the Lynx project, but also on the standardization problem. It asked why the political leadership did not interfere at an earlier stage. From the repertoire of the political leadership, it seems natural to take measures as a consequence, if only to restore the image and trustworthiness of the political leadership.

**Information to Parliament**

The CoA stated that Parliament has never had complete and clear information on the financial aspects of the Lynx procurement project. Considering the financial control role of the CoA (and Parliament!) it is clear that the CoA considers this a major point.

From the perspective of the Navy, on the contrary, this is initially a less relevant problem. Nevertheless the Navy recognized that Parliament has the right to receive more information. Besides, responsible functionaries within the Navy perceived that Parliament and the political leadership were quite sensitive to the CoA critique at this point. The Navy therefore felt impelled to provide more information. Although they still considered it an extra burden, they gradually discovered an unexpected advantage of increased interaction with members of Parliament: it increased the lobby opportunities for the Navy and enhanced early commitment of key members of Parliament to Navy projects. Eventually a clear change in external information and relations management by the Navy can be observed. Again we see a change that is not explicitly advocated by the CoA, but seems to be enhanced, if not triggered by it.

The Minister claimed (at least officially) that information to Parliament had been sufficient at all stages. Nevertheless gradual changes in the amount and nature of information to Parliament can be observed, probably to maintain the support of Parliament, which is a key issue in the repertoire of the political leadership.

**Price Control**

The control of spending and prices was also a major point in the CoA repertoire. The Navy, however, was not impressed by the CoA critique in this respect. The Navy was used to substantial increases in prices, high costs of adaptations in design and high costs for building in new equipment. This has to do with the nature of technology and technological development and with the supplier-controlled markets. Inflation and exchange rates also play a substantial role. Finally, the attitude of the Navy, in contrast to the standards of the CoA, is not to buy things as cheaply as possible, but to buy the best with the money that appears to be available.

Those politicians responsible tried, both on their own account and under the perceived pressure from the CoA and Parliament, to gain more control of the financial aspects of procurement processes. The procedures of DMP are an example in case. In 1984 a Contract Commission had already been created within
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the central core of the Ministry. According to the Deputy Minister, this Commission played an increasing role in the negotiation of new contracts. This led to friction between the central department and the Navy with respect to the question of who is actually (responsible for) negotiating procurement contracts. Here we see that the CoA critique (reinforced by Parliament) links easily with notions within the political leadership (budget control, control of the procurement process) and influences the relationship between the Ministry and Navy in the direction of more openness and control of the latter.

Readiness
The very low readiness of the Lynx reported by the CoA hit the Navy at its core. The first reaction was one of disbelief and irritation. According to our Navy contacts, the CoA appeared to lack expertise. For example, many mechanical faults were caused by the relatively high vibration of the Lynx as a consequence of its rotor suspension and were therefore unavoidable. The CoA reacted by pointing out that this probably demonstrated that the Lynx was a bad choice. But the Navy was confirmed in its impression of the lack of expertise of the CoA: the specific rotor suspension made the helicopter very manoeuvrable, a splendid machine! Thus, the high failure rate should be taken as necessary costs. The CoA critique on bad stock-keeping of spare parts was also initially rejected. Spare parts are very expensive and which parts will have to be replaced cannot be known in advance. In some instances spares had not yet even been developed. The Navy saw the lack of a sufficient number of crews as a consequence of training problems, certification and competition with civil aviation.

Nonetheless, the CoA critique hurt because the Navy could not escape the conclusion that essentially the CoA was right: a readiness of around 40 percent is far too low. A number of measures were taken. The first was primarily in presentation: the definition of readiness was changed, which led to somewhat higher percentages. But more fundamental was a large-scale reorganization of maintenance activities in order to perform faster, well-structured and mission-oriented maintenance. Finally, cooperation was sought with a number of other European countries to create a joint pool of spare parts. Here the CoA critique connected with the professional self-image of the Navy, which explains the dual reaction of discrediting the critique and reacting to it by changing organization and procedures.

Intermediate Conclusion
The Lynx case shows how the theoretical framework of structural constructivism can be used to account for (the lack of) organizational learning related to CoA evaluations. Based on the analysis, a number of conditions and mechanisms producing certain forms of organizational learning can be identified. However, before doing so, it seems useful to enlarge the empirical bases for some tentative hypotheses by giving a condensed description of a second case study in which some other mechanisms appear to play a role.
The State Museums

The Report
In October and November 1987 the CoA investigated the performance of state museums with respect to the conservation of cultural objects and services to the general public. These were the main officially stated tasks of the museums. In addition, the CoA explicitly devoted attention to the quality of the management of the museums.

Within a period of three weeks all state museums were investigated, on the one hand to prevent anticipation by the museums and on the other hand in order to be able to report quickly. This approach required working with parallel teams, in part consisting of CoA officials more familiar with other policy fields.

The report, eventually published in September 1988, was quite critical. It mentioned serious problems with respect to registration, conservation, management, security, personnel and financial relations with funding bodies. The public service functions in a number of museums were also judged to be below standard. The CoA asked for more attention to be paid to conservation, better management and uniform and transparent financial regulations. The CoA thought that a ‘direction of solutions for the problems identified’ should be a necessary condition, before museums can be granted more autonomy.

The CoA Repertoire
Table 2 summarizes core CoA repertoire elements.

It is interesting to note that during the 1980s a clear development took place in the CoA repertoire. Both ‘political’ timing and attention paid to management and control are new elements, which are reflected in the approach used in the case of the museums. The timing of the report is directly and explicitly related to the actual discussion within the ministry on the privatization of state museums. The focus on the organization and management of the museums reflects both this current political issue and the growing CoA interest in institutionalized control.

The Impact
Within the framework of this article I limit myself to an account of the reaction of the Minister to the report and the use he made of it. In doing so, I will try to explain ministerial policy from his repertoire and the administrative interactions in which he was involved.

In his formal reaction, the Minister agreed to a very large extent with the CoA

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<td><strong>Court of Audit</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assessment of realization of initially formulated goals.</td>
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<td>• Good managerial and financial control mechanisms are an important guarantee for good policy implementation.</td>
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<td>• Uniform and transparent regulations are important.</td>
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<td>• Timing of reports to induce actual use and influence in the political process.</td>
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report. He considered the arrears in conservation ‘very alarming’ and he did not deny the other problems identified by the CoA. However, he felt that for the most part the CoA did not consider the causes of these problems, nor the impediments to their solution. He thought that the fact that different ministries are involved in the financial, control and policy aspects of the museums creates much inefficiency and lack of effectiveness, because of bureaucratic procedures and equivocal steering. In general, the fact that state museums are part of public administration hinders improvement because, amongst other things, of the lack of financial incentives for new creative initiatives and public-oriented activities. From this interpretation of the problems, more autonomy appeared to be a sensible solution. The Minister was determined to move in that direction.

Note that the Minister accepts the problem assessment of the CoA, but is heading for a solution quite contrary to the CoA argument. Both elements of this reaction can be understood from the repertoire of the Minister and his staff and the meaning the CoA report acquired in their interpretation of it.

The Minister’s reaction reflects changes in the repertoire of the Ministry that had taken place in the years preceding the CoA report. In summary the main developments were:

- **Debate on core business.** From the beginning of the 1980s, a debate developed, especially within the Ministry, with respect to the question of what the main tasks of the state are in relation to museums. Initially this debate was linked to efforts to separate the responsibilities of different levels of government in this connection, and to cuts in the state budget. But later a new element came onto the agenda. It concerned the growing uneasiness associated with the combination of a general responsibility for cultural policy and a specific management responsibility for a selected number of museums. From these elements in the debate, the notion was constructed that the Minister only has a responsibility at the *macro* level (including conservation of the total national cultural inheritance) and not on the *micro* level of museum management. Some groups within the Ministry, however, stuck to a more comprehensive interpretation of their role.

- **Autonomy and privatization.** The idea of more autonomy for state museums, discussed increasingly within the Ministry and in public, was also connected with budget cuts. A decision to privatize the Dutch Open-Air Museum was based on this consideration. But soon, the idea that more autonomy may enhance the performance of museums and solve many problems acquired a central place in the debate. The factions within the Department promoting privatization were gaining ground, although other factions resisted the idea. Within the circle of state museums there was dissension: some museums were quite enthusiastic about the idea, others were more reluctant. The former expected a reduction in bureaucracy and room for their own policy development; the latter feared that the government would drastically reduce its (financial) responsibility.

- **Conservation.** In 1984 the Ministry had already recognized arrears in the conservation of national heritage. In the following years, the awareness of
the problems kept growing and the assessment of the situation became increasingly negative. The Ministry related the problem to the low management quality in the museums, on the one hand, and to the lack of financial means on the other.

In sum, in the course of the 1980s, the repertoire of some groups within the Ministry developed in a direction that facilitated links with the definitions of the problems of the museums as the CoA identified them in 1988. However, at the same time a repertoire with respect to solutions developed, which was in some respects at variance with the argument the CoA developed. It seems, then, that the CoA assessment of the shortcomings of the museums strengthened the repertoire and the position of groups with similar problem definitions. Consequently the solutions generated by these groups gained strength in the internal debate, which eventually may have contributed to the decision in 1991 to privatize the museums. For, although the CoA had rejected that solution for the near future, the CoA report was frequently cited to support the privatization proposals.

Conclusions

In this article I have examined when and in what way (outcomes of) evaluation studies are used in governmental learning processes. I have described two cases in which the impact of CoA reports on policy making, control and management were (partly) reconstructed, using a structural constructivist theoretical framework.

Both cases support the central ideas of the theory:

- The impacts of evaluations are constructed by actors, using their existing repertoires.
- These construction processes do not take place in isolation but in a context of other actors and other construction processes. For example, the impact of the Lynx report is clearly related to the interaction between the Ministry and the Navy. The impact of the museum report must be understood in the context of ongoing interactions within the Ministry and between the Ministry and museums, resulting in new repertoires.
- A decisive point in determining the substantial impact of evaluation lies in the linking of (new) elements in the evaluations to (elements in) existing repertoires and/or in their contribution to loosening existing anchors of repertoire elements. The CoA critique on the readiness of the Lynx connects with the professional self-image of the Navy, resulting in adaptations not suggested by the CoA. The museum report strengthens repertoires ‘under construction’ within the Ministry.
- Often elements of evaluation link to the repertoires of certain actors or factions. Consequently, changes in relations between these actors or factions and other groups show up. The subsequent interaction processes determine the eventual links and the further developments. Here the museum case provides a clear example.
In the case studies, actual developments were interpreted \textit{ex post} in terms of social construction processes. However, inspired by the insight the case analysis gave, it is possible to derive more general hypotheses that are consistent with the theory developed here. When sufficiently operationalized, these hypotheses can be tested. Here, I confine myself to a number of examples.

Evaluations will have \textit{direct} effects if they link to the existing repertoire of the unit involved. As is clear from the case studies, such links are often partial. There may be some overlap with respect to performance criteria, or with respect to problem definitions, or with respect to policy options, or with respect to assessment of relevant contexts etc., but not in all of these dimensions. The direction and intensity of effects will probably depend on the nature and the measure of overlap. This gives rise to a first hypothesis:

\textbf{hypothesis 1:} direct effects of evaluation on units evaluated reflect the nature and measure of links between the repertoires involved: (a) arguments and recommendations based on overlapping repertoire elements will be taken up by the unit evaluated, at least insofar as they are not perceived as contradictory with other repertoire elements; (b) assessments made in an evaluation that fit in with the repertoire of the unit evaluated will be taken as supportive and reinforce the repertoire, irrespective of how such assessments are used in the arguments of the evaluator; (c) redefinition of repertoires of units evaluated is connected to overlapping parts of repertoires.

From the cases it is also clear that units evaluated are no monoliths. This leads to a second hypothesis:

\textbf{hypothesis 2:} to the extent that assessments and recommendations of evaluations do link more closely to the repertoires of certain individuals or factions within the unit evaluated, or to developments in those repertoires, their effects will be stronger and in the direction advocated by these individuals or factions.

Insofar as the above is convincing, it may have a number of consequences for evaluation practice. As noted in the introduction, evaluation may have different purposes or functions. My suggestions (which in a sense are hypotheses as well) only pertain to enhancing learning processes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item If evaluation is to enhance organizational learning processes, the mode and content of the evaluation should link to the repertoire of one or more actors involved. Linkage can occur via the content of the evaluation, the standards used by the evaluator, anticipation by actors of the reactions of others, or in other direct or indirect ways. Therefore, it may help evaluators if they gain knowledge of the repertoires of key actors.
  \item Knowledge of repertoires can also help to initiate explicit discussion on central presuppositions, value orientations etc. that are embedded in these repertoires. This may give rise to another type of learning process, other than mere discussion of specific behaviours, because it may enhance other interaction processes and other linkages.
  \item Knowledge of different repertoires may help to tailor evaluation to trigger unconventional interactions in the policy area, which may give rise to new types of learning processes.
\end{itemize}
Evaluators, like other actors, perceive and analyse using their own repertoire. They take substantive positions accordingly. In general there is nothing wrong with that, but it requires evaluating one’s own positions from the point of view of other actors. Evaluators’ positions, however controversial, can trigger interaction and learning processes that give rise to changes that many may consider improvements. Looking for new links is something quite different from taking on other actors’ positions uncritically.

An essential element of evaluation aiming at learning should be to take account of the relevant context as perceived by the actors in the policy area. A number of comments in the CoA report on the Lynx (on lack of competition and standardization) were not taken very seriously within the Navy because they confirmed the idea that the CoA lived in another world. This does not imply that the evaluator should take for granted the context as actors see it, but only that they acknowledge that the context is present in the repertoires of the actors and hence will reinforce their ways of (re)acting.

Notes

1. Mastop and Faludi (1993) suggest in an article on the impact of strategic policy, that because of the types of complications mentioned in the text, one should concentrate on ‘use’, irrespective of its direction. I do not agree, and believe that both theoretical analysis and empirical research have more to offer.

2. I refrain here from the question of whether there exist other types of organizational change. It may be suggested that some actors have the ‘power’ to force units evaluated to change, even if those units have not learned anything from the evaluation. But even then, organizational behaviour changes as a consequence of new experiences, information and/or interactions, which I defined as learning. Moreover, from the perspective adopted here, power is only ‘operational’ to the extent and in the way it is reproduced in interaction.

3. Perhaps organizational learning is after all a good metaphor for individual learning processes, because the latter unavoidably take place in a social context. This question, however, is outside the scope of this article.

4. For a more comprehensive discussion of the theory see Van der Meer and Roodink, 1991; Vissers, 1994.

5. In a sense technology in organizations can be considered as the most reified and anchored way of thinking and acting: it structures organizational behaviour in a way that is often both subconscious and experienced as hard to change.

6. Weick thinks this process the core of ‘organizing’ which he defines as ‘a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by sensible interlocked behaviours’ (Weick, 1979: 3).

7. In the research I have collaborated on with my colleagues Geert Vissers and Gert Jan de Vries, we have investigated learning processes triggered by five Court of Audit evaluations.

8. For factual information about the CoA and its development over time, see Stevers, 1979; Dolmans, 1989; and Leeuw, 1992.

9. The following account is based on Parliamentary Documents and interviews. The documents are categorized under the following numbers: 12994 No. 2 (Defence White
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Book, 1974); 13100 No. 7 (Defence Budget, 1975); 14600 No. 12 (Report of the Minister of Defence, 1978); 18169 No. 2 and No. 78 (Defence White Book, 1984); 19282 No. 2 to No. 5 (Report of the Deputy Minister of Defence, 1985–7); and 19897 No. 1 to No. 12 (CoA Report on Lynx, 1987).

10. A more comprehensive report is in preparation (in Dutch).
11. Extensive interviews were conducted with a former Deputy Minister of Defence (1981–9), the Head of Air Operations and a PR Officer of the Navy, and three members of the Defence Bureau of the CoA that were involved in the Lynx report.
12. The same holds, to an even larger extent, for the CoA report on the procurement of the Walrus submarines, which had appeared just one and a half years earlier.
13. A Navy respondent, however, indicated that the Walrus report was the immediate cause of DMP.
15. The then Deputy Minister of Defence thinks that the CoA investigations were probably a very important direct reason for the establishment of the Project Bureau.
16. We used, amongst other things, Parliamentary Documents 19066 No. 1 to No. 35 (Memorandum on Museum Policy); 20697 No. 1 to No. 10 (CoA report on State Museums) and 21973 No. 1 to No. 5 (Memorandum on Privatization of Museums). We also conducted a large number of interviews with CoA officials involved, civil servants from the ministry and directors of museums. An extensive report of our research is in preparation.
17. The explanation of this change, which can also be interpreted as the consequence of organizational learning processes, is outside the scope of this article.
18. These developments too, can be analysed as consequences of organizational learning processes. Again, however, this is outside the scope of this article.

References


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